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Abstract - Despite the growing interest in the subject of micro finance very little, if any, academic 
research on the Palestinian case exists. This paper starts filling this gap by analysing the 
development of the micro credit industry in Palestine between 2000 and 2008.  
This paper shows that at macro level the industry has a strong potential for growth, but its full 
development is frustrated by inefficiencies in credit allocation and high level of risk, whose most 
evident sign being the problem of late or no re-payment of loans. 
By using data from one of the most important micro credit agencies, the Arab Centre for 
Agricultural Development (ACAD), we analyse the determinants of late payment. The most 
important results are that high interest rates increase the probability of late repayment, loan size, 
when above the “micro” threshold has no impact, while female customers and the one with banks 
guarantees are less likely to pay late. The policy implications are that while going towards a more 
“market-based” approach might provide some advantages in terms of risk reduction, it will not per 
se solve the problem while will certainly expose the most vulnerable sectors of the population to 
further credit rationing 
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Over the last two decades the success of various micro credit programs, mainly 
although not exclusively in the Indian sub-continent, made micro finance a subject 
with growing popularity among economists and policy makers.
1 Although substantial 
disagreement still exists on most of the issues surrounding micro-lending, in particular 
on the key problem of whether it should be provided by non-profit organisations on a 
non-market basis or by commercial institutions charging market-level interests, 
consensus seems to have emerged on the strong potential that micro finance has as a 
device to foster economic growth and reduce vulnerability and disparity among 
populations.
2  
Despite the growing interest in the topic, still very little academic research, if 
anything at all, exists for the Palestinian case. Our preliminary survey of the literature 
has reveled that available studies do not go further than an MA dissertation published 
by the University of Uppsala in 2008 and some descriptive works, largely at micro 
level.
3 
This is surprisingly given that Palestine is a very interesting case study for at least two 
reasons. Firstly, the lack of academic attention for this subject stands at odds with the 
fact that Palestine’s micro credit is in fact a vibrant and developing industry, 
characterized by the presence of a high number of very diverse institutions. Over the 
years, dedicated organizations have found their ways to address issues of relative lack 
of financial deepening and of widespread credit rationing from “high street” banks, in 
a context where endless military conflict and political and economic instability 
exacerbated these problems. On top of the natural interest that such a dynamic sector 
is supposed to stimulate, the study of micro credit in Palestine is interesting for 
another reason. Developing more direct participation in, and stronger responsibility 
                                                 
 
 
1 See, among many others,  Bounman (1989 ) and Yunus and Weber (2007) 
2 See Burritt (2003) and Hardy et. al. (2002) for international institutions perspective on the issue  
3 Abuznaid (2005), Abukarsh (2005), and Fridell, (2008).   2
for the economy among less affluent and often cut-off members of the society is 
considered one of the main aim of micro finance. Such development of stake-holding 
is important in every developing country, but it is particularly relevant in economies 
where the availability of a disproportionate amount of external loans and donations 
risks to ingenerate passive if not parasite attitudes. In this regard Palestine is a very 
good case in point; as stressed for example by the Israel/Palestine Centre for 
Research and Information, empowerment and direct participation in the lending 
process characterising micro finance projects might help to break the vicious circle 
between dependence on foreign aid - lack of entrepreneurship and stake-holding - 
further dependence on external support. Thus the effectiveness of micro credit to 
develop stake-holding, for example by using peer pressure as a way to enforce 
collective loans contracts, is worth some investigation.  
This chapter, which is largely based upon the statistical analysis of an original data 
set, is conceived as a first preliminary study of the issues above and it is structured as 
follows; section 1 provides an overview of the institutional characteristics of the credit 
market in Palestine, by looking at both the ordinary banking sector and at micro credit 
institutions. Section 2 covers some theoretical issues concerning the estimation of 
demand for micro credit. Using aggregate data, section 3 looks at the actual extent of 
the potential market for micro finance in Palestine and at the amount, directions, and 
characteristics of supply. Section 4 narrows the perspective on supply by looking at 
performance indicators, showing some of the problems characterizing micro credit 
delivery in Palestine. Using original data from one of the main micro credit agency, 
sections 5 and 6 investigate some possible reasons of such inefficiencies. More 
specifically, section 5 describes data and methodology, while section 6 discusses 
results. Section 7 concludes.  
 
Section 1. The Palestinian credit market: institutional background 
Before going deeper into the analysis of the aims, efficiency and effectiveness of 
Palestinian micro credit, a rapid overview of the main institutional characteristic of 
the credit market is in order. 
The Palestinian banking system consists of the Palestine Monetary Authority (PMA) 
which performs some of the regulatory and monitoring functions of the central bank, 
twenty foreign and domestic licensed banks, plus various moneychangers and micro 
credit institutions. By August 2009 twenty different banks operated in Palestine, ten   3
of which foreign (eight Jordanian, one Egyptian, and HSBC bank). Their total equity 
amounted to about $893.8 million, with a paid-up-capital of about 77.6%. Banks 
conduct business through a network of 205 branches, 159 located in West Bank and 
46 in the Gaza Strip (Table 1). 
 
Table 1: Number of banks and branches in Palestine 
  Number of Banks  Number of bank branches 
   West Bank  Gaza Strip  Total 
2001  21 89  35  124 
2002  20 89  36  125 
2003  20 94  37  131 
2004  20 96  37  133 
2005  20 101  38  139 
2006  21 111  40  151 
2007  21 119  41  160 
2008  21 144  46  190 
August 2009  20 159  46  205 
   Source: Palestinian Monetary Authority, 2009. 
 
Notwithstanding the extraordinary risky conditions under which it operates, 
the Palestinian banking system still retains a high degree of confidence 
among its clients, as showed by the increasing volume of total deposits. Data 
show that between the end of 2007 and August 2009, deposits increased by 
22.8% to reach the level of about $6.3 billion. The increase in the supply of 
credit facilities paralleled the rise in deposits; by August 2009 total credit 
facility have reached the level of about $2 Billion with an increase of more 
than 17% vis-à-vis the value at the end of 2008. However, as section 3 below 
shows, still Palestinian banks operate a very prudent ratio between deposit 
and supply of loans, as well as charging very high interest rates. 
The micro finance industry in Palestine is dominated by ten major institutions 
grouped under the umbrella of The Palestinian Network for Small and 
Microfinance institutions (PNSMF). Within this group, four associations 
(Faten, Acad, Asala and Unrwa) had, in 2007, about half the total number of   4
active clients
4 Below we provide a brief description of their main activities, 
policies, and institutional features. 
Palestine for Credit and Development – FATEN 
FATEN has been active since 1998, and begun to offer loans one year later, in March 
1999. Faten is the biggest micro credit association in Palestine and operates with an 
explicit efficiency and self-sustainability target. Faten offers a wide range of loans, 
from individual to group, and of various sizes; although it mainly targets women, this 
is not the exclusive market. 
Palestinian Business Women Association - ASALA 
Asala has been active since 1997 and contrary to Faten, it specialises on women 
customers. This institutional feature means that the efficiency target is somehow 
constrained by other goals, in particular empower of Palestinian women. Asala has 
two types of lending programs: micro lending program (group and individual loans) 
and small lending program. Micro lending program is conceived as a device to allow 
a woman or a group of low-income women to start an economic activity; loan size 
varies from about $100 to $5000. Small lending are not only more conspicuous in size 
($5000 to $20000) but also subject to more controls and guarantees. However, the aim 
is still to allow women entrepreneurs to start or expand a business.  
3. Arab Centre for Agricultural Development – ACAD 
ACAD is a non-profit, non-governmental organization that has been officially 
registered in Jerusalem since 1993, and registered by the Palestinian Authority since 
2001. It offers services to established low-income-generating business or to 
entrepreneurs-in-the-making in order to promote self sustaining employment and 
income-generating projects. Like the other organisations, Acad provides differed kind 
(and size) of loans. Acad serves both male and female customers. 
4. United Nations Relief and Works Agency – UNRWA 
The micro finance program of UNRWA started credit operation in 1991. The original 
aim was to create employment through capital-investment loans in existing business 
and start ups. By 1994 the focus shifted from the support to small and medium scale 
enterprise to microfinance. This change was even more visible after the 2000-2001 
second intifada when most resources were channelled towards the support of poor 
people in Palestine.  
                                                 
4 Source: The International Finance Corporation and The Palestinian Network for Small and 
Microfinance Institutions (2007).   5
 
Section 2. Estimating potential demand; theoretical issue  
The first theoretical issue concerning the functioning of micro finance institutions in 
Palestine is the definition of their potential market. Although Burritt (2003) assumes 
that potential demand for microfinance services seems to be infinite if we take into 
consideration demand for a wide array of financial services beyond loans, including 
savings, insurance and remittances, still a more precise definition needs to be 
provided. In theory the potential market for micro credit institutions depends on two 
factors: on the one hand the amount of population able to express actual demand for 
financial services and, on the other, the share of such demand satisfied by ordinary 
commercial banks. In theory the clients of microfinance institutions are low-income 
self-employed entrepreneurs, both in cities and in the countryside. Rural clients are 
expected to be small farmers or other individual engaging in small-scale activities 
such as food processing and petty trade. Potential urban clients are a more diverse 
group including shopkeepers, service-providers, artisans, street vendors and others. 
Both classes of entrepreneurs demand financial services either to start or to enlarge 
their activity, but low level of income generation makes them very expensive clients 
for ordinary banks. Thus the scope for micro credit depends, in theory, on the number 
of such potential clients, but also on the extent to which ordinary banks are or are not 
interested in this market.  
To determine the dimension of the potential market for micro credit, a mainstream 
approach consists in dividing the active population into groups depending on their 
income.  Visually this approach can be represented by the pyramidal graph 1 below. 
Various segments of the market can be described as: 
A: rich individual who are served by ordinary financial institutions and are not 
interested in microfinance loans. 
B: relatively affluent individuals (or at least above the poverty line) who might or 
might not have alternatives to microfinance institutions depending on banks’ 
approach. 
C: poor individuals who are classified below the poverty line but still having saving 
capacity; this is usually the main target for microfinance institutions. 
D: individuals who are just above the classification of “poorest of the poor” and still 
have some level of saving capacity. 
E: the poorest of the poor, with no saving capacity at all.    6
 
Figure 1: micro credit market segmentation 
 












 Source: Bedoya (2006) 
 
Potential demand for micro credit can be thus defined as the sum of B, C and D, 
although C is the main target. However, exactly how low or high income is supposed 
to be in order for potential clients to be considered either by ordinary financial 
intermediaries or micro credit institutions varies according to many factors. For 
example how much of the B segment is going to be considered by ordinary credit 
institutions depends on their risk-taking attitude as well as on the availability of 
alternative investment opportunities. On the other hand, from the point of view of 
micro credit institutions serving or not the E segment depends on whether they want 
to engage only with self-sustained market-based investment, or whether for 
political/ideological reasons they also want to target the segment of population (the 
very poor with no saving capacity) that could never became part of the official credit 
market. 
 
Section 3. Actual demand and available supply  
Although a precise analysis of the attitudes and policies of various kinds of banking 
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Saving capacity 
No Saving capacity   7
suggests that the potential market for micro credit in Palestine is significant. This is 
because the amount of population that can be classified as being part of the B to D 
segments is large (if not increasing), but also because by general standards ordinary 
banks seem to have a rather conservative approach. 
A rapid overview at general macroeconomic conditions in Palestine indicate that after 
substantial increase between 2002 and the end of 2005, from 2006 real GDP declined 
while the rate of unemployment stabilized around 20-25% (Fig.2). 
 
Figure 2: Real GDP vs. Unemployment rate (2000Q1 – 2008Q3) 
 
Source: Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (2009).
5 
 
A closer investigation, however, shows that increasing poverty at national level 
paralleled growing inequality between different geographic areas. In particular a large 
discrepancy is evident between West Bank and Gaza Strip. Figure 3, shows that after 
2006 GDP per capita in the Gaza Strip declined sharply, while it increased in the West 







                                                 
5 1997 is base year for real GDP during 2000-2003, and 2004 is the base year for 2004-2008.    8
Figure 3: Real GDP per Capita 
 
Source: Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (2009). 
 
This picture finds its parallel in the different patter of the rate of unemployment in the 
two areas (Fig. 4). 
 
Figure 4: Unemployment Rate in Palestinian Territory 
 
               Source: Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (2009). 
 
This process of growing inequality at geographic level went hand in hand with an 
increase in the unevenness of income distribution. By the first half of 2006 The Gini   9
coefficient indicated that inequality of income distribution was about 64%.
6 
Meanwhile by the end of 2006 the number of people considered as “poor” in 
Palestinian Territory increased by 13.6% as compared to the end of 2005, reaching the 
level of 2.1 millions
7  
Given that poorer people have less access, if any, to bank loans, changes in the 
macroeconomic conditions of Palestine seemed to have increased the potential market 
for micro finance. 
On the other hand, by examining the ratio between the level of deposits and amount of 
total facilities offered by commercial banks in Palestinian Territory in the last few 
years we can see how prudent the approach was. During the mentioned period, the 
average ratio of total facilities to deposits was only 33.8%, and while a growing trend 
is noticeable up to 2006, the following years the tendency inverted. (figure5).  
 
Figure 5: Ratio of total credit facilities to total deposits 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration from The Palestine Monetary Authority (PMA), 2009. 
 
In general terms, this conservative lending policy is due to the unstable political 
environment and the weak legal system; as a matter of facts, it is certainly not a 
coincidence that the ratio of total facilities to deposits began to decrease after the mid 
of 2006, following the electoral victory of Hamas, the freeze of the international 
                                                 
6 Source: Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (2006). 
7 Source: PCBS (2007). The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) and the Institute 
Universitaire d’Etudes du Développement (IUED), define poverty line to be $2.7 per day, and very 
poor line is $1.35 per day.    10
donations, and the consequent salary crisis. However, on top of the generic political 
instability, the Palestinian credit market also suffers from a number of other structural 
problems. Firstly, given the absence of a proper national currency, Us Dollars, Israeli 
Shekels, and Jordanian Dinars are used in parallel. This means not only that neither 
the Palestinian government nor the Palestinian monetary authority can implement any 
meaningful monetary policy, but also that inter-banking lending is difficult if not 
impossible. In addition, the large dependence of the Palestinian government on 
foreign aids and custom clearances revenues collected on their behalf by the Israeli 
government creates further uncertain and an high-risky environment which force 
banks to adopt a conservative lending policies. Furthermore, the dominance of foreign 
banks over the domestic one implies that savings collected in Palestine are often 
invested elsewhere. 
The same problems leading to a particularly conservative approach on the part of the 
Palestinian banks, also explain their relative inefficacy measured in terms of spread 
between passive and active interest rates. Figure 6 below shows how such difference, 
disaggregated by currency in which deposits are collected and loans offered, is much 
higher than in the countries where the same currencies are used.  
 






















Source: Authors’ elaboration from The Palestine Monetary Authority (PMA), 2009. 
    11
If the spread vis-à-vis the US probably surprises nobody, and the one vis-à-vis Jordan 
is not that remarkable, on the other hand these data show how dramatic is the 
difference between operating in Israel and Palestine. 
The declining economic conditions of vast sectors of the population, combined with 
limited amount of credit supply from ordinary banks (or credit supplied at very high 
interest rates), suggests that over the last few years the potential market for micro 
finance in Palestine grew. The idea that in Palestine a substantial potential for the 
expansion of the micro credit sector exists is also supported by results of various 
empirical surveys. According to a survey conducted in 2005, the number of potential 
clients, estimated in about 30,000 in 2005, was supposed to have increased up to 
100,000 in the following 4-6 years.
8 However a subsequent survey dating May 2007 
showed how such a development had remained largely on paper, partly because of the 
unwillingness of small entrepreneurs to demand for funds, but also because of the 
inability of the credit market to respond to demand when it surfaced. Micro credit 
institutions, although less rigid in their attitude than ordinary banks, proved to be 
partially guilty as well.
9  
Data from a more recent survey (table 2) corroborate this idea. In particular while the 
feeling in 2005 was of a potential rapid increase in the number of clients data show 
that, in fact, the number declined, while other indicators confirm a pattern of 
stagnation if not decline.
10 
 
Table 2: Development of Microfinance institutions, borrowers, and clients 
  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008Q1  2008Q2  2008Q3 
Net Loan Portfolio 
(thousands US$)    37,738 28,540 25,086  32,771 33,697  37,577 
 Nbr. of branches    38 46 50 53  53  53  56 
 Nbr. of staff    264 340 320 315  294  332  306 
 Nbr. of active 
borrowers    16,787 24,848 22,017 18,124 15,422 19,943  22,224 
 Male    6,774 12,065  10,668 9,016  6,674  10,398 11,696 
                                                 
8 Israel/Palestine Centre for Research and Information (2005). 
9 The International Finance Corporation and The Palestinian Network for Small and Microfinance 
Institutions (2007). 
10 These numbers represents the following seven micro finance institutions representing more than 80% 
of the market in terms of number of active clients, active borrowers and portfolios: ASALA, 
CHF/Ryada, FATEN, PARC/SLA, PDF/SLU, REEF and UNRWA/MMD.   12
 Female    10,013 12,783 11,350  9,108  8,748  9,545  10,528 
 Nbr. of active 
clients    20,165  28,862  26,410 23,057  22,083  25,134  27,298 
 Male    6,774 12,059  10,656 8,994  8,568  10,376 11,677 
 Female    13,391 16,803 15,755 14,063 13,515 14,758  15,621 
Source: The Palestinian Network for Small and Microfinance Institutions (2008).
11 
 
Section 4. Supply: Goals and performance 
On the basis of the evidence provided in the previous section it is clear that Palestine 
has a substantial potential for expansion of micro lending. However the impression is 
that such expansion might have been frustrated by relatively poor performance in 
credit allocation. In order to understand the extent of this problem it is worthwhile to 
analyse some key performance indicators provided by the same 2008 survey 
described above. The overall picture is that although some positive results can be 
noticed, still substantial problems persist, the main one being the decline in 
productivity which is indirectly reflected in the increase of the cost per individual loan 
(table 3).  
 
Table 3: Aggregate measures of performance/efficiency of the main micro credit 
institutions 
  2005 2006 2007  2008Q2  2008Q3 
# of loans per Loan Officer  125 134 121 110 120 
# of loans per Staff member  73 70 58 60 72 
Cost per loan in US dollar  184 338 397 381 394 
Average disbursed loan size US$   1,352 1,486 1,569 2,257 2,090 
Yield on portfolio   13.5% 11.5% 11.2% 16.2% 16.7% 
Source: The Palestinian Network for Small and Microfinance Institutions (2008). 
 
                                                 
11 Notes:  
- Data for quarter one is estimated based on updated numbers for 6 MFIs and projected numbers for 
one MFI. 
- Number of active borrowers: The numbers of individuals who currently have an outstanding loan 
balance with the MFI or are responsible for repaying any portion of the gross loan portfolio. This 
number is based on the individual borrowers rather than the number of groups. 
- Number of active clients: the number of individuals who are active borrowers, depositors or both. 
Individuals who have multiple loans or accounts with the MFI are counted as a single client. Depositors 
apply only to deposits that are held by the MFI, not to those deposits held in other institutions by the 
MFI’s clients (i.e. facilitated savings). In the Palestinian case, PARC is the only MFI among Sharakeh 
members that accept deposits (saving) by its member. The difference between the number of active 
clients and number of active borrowers is explained by PARC depositors.   13
Indicators of self-sustainability (table 4) show a positive trend but, overall, they reveal 
a similarly disappointing picture. 
 
Table 4: Aggregate measures of sustainability of the main micro credit 
institutions 






ROE (donations excl.)    -1.6 -11.2 -4.5  4.4  4.6  15.5 
 ROA (donations excl.)    -1.5 -10.2 -4.1  4.0  4.0  5.1 
OSS  (Operational self -
sufficiency)  88.2 63.7 81.5  100.9  101.4 
 
Sources: The Palestinian Network for Small and Microfinance Institutions (2008) for Palestine; Tucker 
and Miles (2004) for world average 2001. 
 
ROE, for example, despite being positive for the first time in 2008 is still very distant 
from what the world average was in 2001. Furthermore it is unclear how much of this 
result comes from improvements in the macroeconomic scenario rather than from any 
increase in the quality of the managerial process. On top of this, it must be noticed 
that results drop once donations are taken into account. In other words Palestinian 
micro finance institutions are still far from self-sustainability. 
On the other hand, over time loans became less risky although also in this case 
whether or not this should be seen as the consequence of improved managerial 
practices remains a matter of debate. Whatever the causes, according to data presented 
in table 5, the risk on the portfolio of the microfinance institutions included in the 
survey (and representing more than 80% of the market) dropped from 40.8% in 2006 
to 12.0% in the third quarter of 2008.  
 
Table 5: Aggregate measures of risk of the main micro credit institutions 
(Par 30 international standards: 5% or below) 
  2005 2006 2007  Q2  2008    Q3  2008   
PAR >30 days   9.40%  40.80% 23.20% 14.80% 12.00% 
PAR >180 days   3.90% 18.00%  15.60% 9.90%  7.90% 
Write-off index   18.20% 5.20% 57.20% 2.90%  2.50% 
Source: The Palestinian Network for Small and Microfinance Institutions (2008).  
 
This drop, however, is far from putting Palestine in line with international standard, as 
about 12% of late repayment is more than double what international agencies consider   14
as a safe indication (5% or below). This means that even in this are according to 
general standards performance is not high. 
 
Section 5: data and methodology 
Results from sections 2 to 4 indicate that Palestine is an economy with a promising 
potential for the development of micro credit, but also that expansion of the industry 
is frustrated by high costs and under-performance in the process of credit allocation. 
Among other issues, it is evident that the problem of overdue loans and structural risk 
seems to be still acute. Although exogenous macroeconomic instability, in particular 
the 2006 events, can certainly explain a large part of the problem in the short-term, on 
the other hand the processes of selection and monitoring of clients, as well as of 
contracts enforcement, play a fundamental part in limiting the phenomenon in the 
longer run.  In this section we examine this issue by looking at the performance of one 
of the main micro finance institutions operating in Palestine: the Arab Centre for 
Agricultural Development (ACAD). More specifically we are interested in 
determining which variables most impact on late repayment, and the extent to which it 
is possible to correct some of these problems. 
For this study we use information on loans provided by ACAD between 1995 and 
2008; specifically we selected a sample of about 2700 loans which were closed (or 
financed) by the end of 2008. For most contracts the data set provides information 
about the characteristics of both the loan itself and the borrower.
12 The former include 
geographic location (West Bank vs. Gaza Strip), economic sector, expected duration, 
size, interest rate, nature of guarantees (personal or bank-provided),
13 destination 
(micro, small or woman-specific), type (“normal” or “Islamic”), and date of beginning 
of the loan. The latter include information on age, level of education, family income, 
and gender of the borrower, as well as the number of the people he/she financially 
supports. Information also includes the actual date of the final repayment of the loan 
which, by comparison with the expected date, allows generating statistics on late 
repayment. Data also report loans written-off and loans which received an extension 
(or period of “grace”). 
                                                 
12 Available information varies from case to case and eventually only 1904 cases have been used in the 
regressions. 
13 Bank guarantee means that bank guarantees the client by committing to transfer the employee’s 
benefits to the microfinance institution when its required.   15
In our model the dependent variable has been constructed by identifying 4 different 
outcomes of loans: paid on time, paid within 3 months from deadline, paid later than 3 
months, and written-off. Although the amount of loans paid later than 3 months is the 
standard indicator of risk, we believe that a more nuanced variable can give us a better 
understanding of the process generating aggregate risk. By constructing the variable 
this way we are also assuming that late repayment and inability to pay are different 
degrees of severity of the same problem, not two different ones. 
Before describing the econometric model and its results, it is worthwhile to analyse 
some descriptive statistics. Table 6 below provides a breakdown of outcomes of loans 
(closed, financed, written off) before December 2008.  
 
Tab. 6: Outcome of closed and financed loans 
  Number % 
Paid on time  561 20.34 
Less than 3 months late  836 30.31 
More than three months late  1,222 44.31 
Written-off  139 5.04 
Total  2,758 100.00 
Source: Elaboration from ACAD 
 
The picture shows an extremely high percentage (almost half) of loans paid very late 
or written-off, something that would put Acad outside the national average. However 
it is important to stress that the choice of limiting our attention to loans closed by 
2008 overstresses the impact of all loans that ended-up paid very late or even written-
off as the result of the 2006 crisis. In fact, the latest data provided by ACAD itself 
indicate a much better picture for 2008, and one which is in line with national 
standards.
14 
  The available data also allows looking at the breakdown of loans outcomes 
disaggregated by some of the most significant variables: location, gender of the 




                                                 
14 ACAD official statistics available on www.mixmarket.org/mfi/acad   16
Tab. 7: outcome of loans by variable 
 Location Gender  Guarantees 
  West 
Bank 





















































































Total  2,561 187  2,748 733  1,523  2,256 829 1,929  2,758 
Source: Elaboration from ACAD 
 
As table 7 shows, most of the loans are concentrated in the West Bank, they are given 
to female customers and, in general, to borrowers only able to provide personal 
guarantees. 
 
Section 6. Model and results 
The purpose of the model is to estimate which of the variables constructed on the 
basis of the available information impact most on late re-payment or lack of 
repayment at all.  
Because of the nature of the dependent variable (re-payment) the model is an ordered 
logit regression which provides statistical probabilities to move from one status to 
another. Various statuses are ranked in terms of progressive length of late re-payment, 
the final status being the loan not be re-paid and consequently written-off. The 
explanatory variables are the following: 
Variable regarding the features of the loan: 
•  Type: type of loan; “normal” loan (= 0) vs. Islamic loan (1)  
•  Int: interest rate, recoded as follows:          
  Frequency % 
Zero interest rate  11 0.4 
1 - 5 % interest rate  1 0.04 
6 - 10 % interest rate  160 5.8 
11 - 15 % interest rate  690 25.01 
more than 16% interest rate  1897 68.76   17
•  Grace: whether (= 1) or not (= 0) the borrower received an extension to the 
payment deadline.
15  
•  Dur: duration of the loan (in months)  
•  Amo: amount of the loan (in dollars) 
•  Sect: sector to which the loan was disbursed, recoded as follows; Agriculture 
(reference group) = 0, Services = 1, Construction = 2, Industry = 3, Trade = 4, 
others = 5. 
•  Guar: this variable represents the type of guarantee; bank-provided (= 0) vs. 
personal (= 1) 
•  Pur:  this represents the purpose of the loan, divided between micro ( = 0), 
small ( = 1) and women ( = 2) loan.
16 
Variables regarding the features of the borrower: 
•  Ndep: number of people financially depending on the borrower; the variable 
is recoded as follows: No dependents (0), 1-6 dependents (1), 7-10 dependents 
(2), and more than 10 dependents (3). Reference group is no dependents.  
•  Sex: gender of the borrower recoded into male (0), female (1). 
•  Inc: yearly income of the family of the applicant expressed in dollars.   
•  Edu: Education level of the applicant where a potential borrower with no 
education is taken as the reference group; the variable is recoded as following:  
Preparatory = 1 Elementary = 2 Secondary = 3 Diploma = 4 University = 5. 
•  Age: age of the borrower (in years). 
Other variables: 
•  Gov:  the geographic location of the loan, differentiating between West Bank 
(= 0), and Gaza Strip (= 1). 
Formally the results of the model appear as follows: 
Repayment = 0.13 Ndep -0.39 Sex* -0.00 Inc -0.01 Edu -0.01 Age** -1.2 Type** – 
                       (.08)            (.22)            (.00)        (.03)         (.00)              (.48) 
0.25 Int*** +0.30 Grace*** -0.06 Dur** +0.00 Amo +0.05 Sect* +0.8 Guar*** – 
(.05)               (.06)                  (.02)               (.00)            (.03)          (.19)         
0.26 Pur +0.47 Gov**          
(.18)         (.18) 
 
*** = significant at 1%, ** = significant at 5%, *= significant at 10% 
                                                 
15 In fact such extension may vary in length but this kind of information is not available. 
16 In fact, despite the label, “women” loans are allocated mainly to female customers, but exceptions 
exists.    18
 
As far as the features of clients are concerned, all the variables whose sign could have 
been predicted (i.e. all variables excluding gender) have the expected one, although 
only age proves to be significant; specifically, older clients tend to be less risky. This 
result opens the door to further questions, for example whether older clients are more 
conservative in their business practices or field or activity, or whether more 
experienced and capable because of a some sort of process of Darwinian selection. In 
the absence of further information, this remains a matter of speculation, but certainly 
an interesting avenue for research. Maybe surprisingly, education seems to play no 
role, although some of its effect can have been captured by the age variable. A 
particularly interesting result is that income (measure directly, or also adding the 
proxy of the number of people financially depending on the borrower) plays no role in 
determining the ability to repay. This result confirms for Palestine what is the general 
established view and one of the intellectual/ideological pillar of the micro credit 
approach; lending to poor customers, per se, is not riskier. 
Gender is significant (although only at 10% confidence interval) and shows that 
female customers (the large majority in the sample) are less likely to pay with delay. 
This result is also indirectly confirmed by the negative sign and significance of the 
type variable which indicates a lower statistical probability of late payment moving 
from micro loan, to small, to “women” type. This is an interesting result as the 
empirical literature is still divided on the issue of whether or not female clients are by 
definition less risky than male ones, especially during specific phases of their life, 
such as when old.
17  
Regarding the nature and features of loans, all variables appear to be significant with 
exception of the one measuring loans size (amo). If we assume that poorer people also 
apply to smaller loans, the fact that the size of the loan does not impact on risk of late 
re-payment confirms the result of the neutrality of the borrower’s income. Things, 
however, can be slightly different; the already-mentioned result of the type variable, 
in fact, suggests the existence of a threshold effect in terms of reducing risk when 
passing from micro to small loans. Combined together then, type and size show that 
very small loans are riskier, but after a given threshold this effect disappears. The 
                                                 
17 See, for example, Bedoya (2006).   19
implication is that very poor customers are riskier but, in general, there is no gain in 
financing relatively more affluent people.  
Length of loans has a significant impact, specifically longer-term loans are less risky 
than short-term ones, but overall this variable has a small impact. Similarly, the sector 
variable appears to be significant, showing that moving away from agriculture seems 
to increase the chance of loans being re-paid late or not re-paid at all. Also in this 
case, however, the coefficient is small, not to mention the fact that the variable is 
significant only at 10% confidence interval. In fact, the two variables which impact 
most on the ability (or lack of) to repay are the type of guarantee and the interest rate. 
Customers with bank guarantee, rather than simple personal ones, appear to be less 
risky. It is important to notice that as far as we know the meaning of this variable is 
that these customers are less likely to pay late, not that guarantees supplied by banks 
were actually used to pay the loans thus avoiding to be late. This means that clearly 
banks in their process of offering guarantees to be used to borrow from micro finance 
institutions operate a process of selection (or of mere signalling) which produces a 
cohort of borrowers which is less risky than the average. A process of selection which 
is performed by banks and somehow “exploited” for free by micro credit agencies. 
The problem is that, as results summarised in table 7 show, the vast majority of 
customers are unable to gain the support of banks, therefore this free process of 
virtuous selection only applies to a minority of customers, something that represents a 
structural and largely irreducible element of risk for micro credit institutions. This 
result is particularly relevant when associated to the positive sign (and significance) of 
the coefficient of the variable indicating the level of interest rate (Int) which shows 
that higher interest rates simply increase the chance of late payment or of no-payment. 
As a matter of fact, combined together these results are perfectly in line with the 
tenants of information economics: in the absence of a process of collection of 
information about clients and of effective monitoring of their behaviour on the part of 
the banks, higher interest rates only produce the classical adverse selection 
mechanism. This also means that in the scenario of increasing costs analysed in 
section 4, trying to counterbalance the problem by charging growing interest rates 
might simply end-up in rising the level of aggregate risk.  
As far as the grace period is concerning, the model shows that loans whose re-
payment was statutorily procrastinated had a higher probability of being paid with 
further delay. This result, however, must be handled with care, as the practice of   20
allowing grace period was in many case a last resort device used in 2007 in the 
attempt of limiting the impact of the 2006 crisis on the ability of borrowers to repay.
18 
In other words it is unclear, theoretically, whether the relation grace/late payment is a 
matter of causation or simple correlation.  
Still on the nature of loans, it is interesting to notice how Islamic loans are not 
necessarily less risky than “normal” ones. This result shows how, despite the 
complaints about the absence of a sufficient supply of faith-compatible loans coming 
from the potential borrowers, engaging with this market does not seem to attract, per 
se, more loyal customers.
19  
Finally, not surprisingly, the model shows that investment in Gaza is more risky than 
in the West Bank.  
 
Section 7. Concluding remarks 
The case of Palestine is a typical example of micro credit in a conflict zone and, as 
such, requires caution when using concepts such as risk (and costs) and efficiency.
 20  
This not only because war, by definition, increases the former and reduces the latter, 
but also because during conflicts micro credit can also be used with wider purposes, 
for example as a device to reduce social desegregation, or lack of any incentive to 
start economic activities. When this happens the concept of efficiency cannot be 
measured only in narrow economic terms. This said, an agreement seems to exist in 
the most recent literature that although operating in an area of conflict changes 
opportunity and constraints, nonetheless issues of structural financial viability should 
not abandoned. In other words, micro credit institutions can still be self-sufficient and 
financially viable even when embracing a wider set of objectives and operate in a 
particularly difficult environment.  
With these considerations in mind, Palestine thus appears to be a promising market 
for micro finance. This not only because of  its potential size and opportunities for 
viable businesses, but also for the possible beneficial effects of micro credit in terms 
of stake-holding in a country whose economic development seems to suffer from 
passive overdependence on external aid. However micro finance institutors are still 
                                                 
18 See, The Palestinian Network for Small and Microfinance Institutions (2008). 
19 According to The International Finance Corporation and The Palestinian Network for Small and 
Microfinance Institutions (2007), religious belief was indicated by the pool of entrepreneurs 
interviewed as the most important reason for not applying to loans. 
20 See, for example, Manalo (2003).   21
straggling to penetrate the full extent of the market, and they still show relatively 
disappointing performance in terms of managing aggregate risk. Clearly the two 
issues are linked together, but disentangling the cause from the effect is neither 
conceptually nor empirically easy. 
By looking at the performance of one of the most important organisations at work, 
ACAD, this paper shows as some of the determinants of high risk are exogenous; for 
example, not surprisingly, the Gaza strip is structurally more risky than the West 
Bank. On the other hand, however, other institutional elements, for example over 
commitment to female customers, go in the direction of reducing risk. In this respect 
the fact that a predominantly male-fought conflict leaves more economic 
opportunities to women is not necessarily a disadvantage. 
On top of structural constraints or benefits, other elements impacting on aggregate 
risk, however, depend on managerial choices. Some of them, for example allowing 
extensions over the deadline for repayment, might still have an exogenous nature, in 
the sense that this was a response to an emergency rather than an actual choice. The 
impact of other variables, however, also suggests that a deeper “market orientation” of 
the activity is capable per se of reducing risk: supplying longer loans (also, allegedly, 
more structural in nature) and/or loans above the micro dimension, as well as asking 
for bank guarantees have a positive impact on the problem of late or no repayment. 
Although this is a well-established result, still the literature is divided on whether 
more extreme “commercialisation” of micro credit is the only or even the best way 
forward.
 21 In the scenario of a being conflict area, this question applies to Palestine in 
a particularly urging way. Eventually selecting customers on the basis of market-
based features and impact on risk comes at the cost of cutting-off the most vulnerable 
segment of the population, and this is a decision that cannot only emerge out of mere 
concerns for the health of balance-sheets, but must be motivated on ideological, moral 
and political ground too. On the other hand, maybe alternatives exist. For example, 
although at the moment Islamic loans do not prove to be less risky than the average, 
maybe pushing more energetically towards that direction and exploiting the 
combination of peer and religion-based pressure as enforcement mechanisms might 
                                                 
21 See, in particular, Campion (2002) and Olivares-Polanco (2005).  
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allow to reduce aggregate risk without impacting too much on the moral component 
of micro credit mission.   23
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